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Britain and France
RECASTING MONISM AND DUALISM IN EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENTARY LAW: THE LISBON TREATY IN
BRITAIN AND FRANCE
Davor Jančić
Abstract: This chapter analyses the relevance of international law concepts of monism
and dualism in the legal and political system of the European Union through the lens
of  national parliaments as inescapable ingredients in giving international law effect in
domestic legal orders. We inquire about the reaction of  the national parliaments of
the United Kingdom and France, as examples of  dualist and monist states, to three
aspects of  the Lisbon Treaty that most affect the European role of  national
parliaments: the EU’s call for national parliaments to monitor the EU institutions’
adherence to the principle of  subsidiarity, the EU’s call for national parliaments to
contribute to the good functioning of  the Union and the extension of  the scope of
the codecision procedure. The main argument of  this chapter is that although the EU
is in many respects a monist constitutional setup that denies significance to the logic
of  mutual structuring of  legal orders espoused in international law, the concepts of
monism and dualism retain their explanatory force as regards the manner in which
domestic parliaments shape their relations with the European Union.
I Introduction: the dwindling relevance of  monism and dualism 
in EU law and its impact on national parliaments
Many premises on which international law, conceived as law between states,1
has been erected have little or no bearing on the legal regulation of  interstate
relations in the context of  the European Union. This is because the EU has become
a sui generis system of  law with its own discrete legal postulates that separate it from
the corpus of  international law. The well-known case law of  the European Court
of  Justice has immensely contributed to this evolution. In the 1963 case of  Van
Gend en Loos, this Court, in order to establish the direct effect of  certain provisions
contained in the founding treaties, ruled that:
1   International law also encompasses relations between states and international organisations as
well as between international organisations themselves.
[EEC] Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual
obligations between the contracting states. This view is confirmed by the
preamble to the Treaty which refers not only to governments but to peoples.
It is also confirmed more specifically by the establishment of  institutions
endowed with sovereign rights, the exercise of  which affects Member States
and also their citizens.2
The following year, in the 1964 case of  Costa v. ENEL, the European Court
of  Justice complemented the above doctrine of  direct effect with that of  supremacy
of  EU law over national law. The following passage from the judgment provides
authority for this:
By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its
own legal system which, on the entry into force of  the Treaty, became an
integral part of  the legal systems of  the Member States and which their courts
are bound to apply. By creating a Community of  unlimited duration, having its
own institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of
representation on the international plane and, more particularly, real powers
stemming from a limitation of  sovereignty or a transfer of  powers from the
States to the Community, the Member States have limited their sovereign rights,
albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a body of  law which binds
both their nationals and themselves.3
Since the citizens could invoke EU law directly in order to seek legal redress,
this development spelled the monist relationship between the EU and national legal
orders. They are integrated and intertwined. In 1978, the European Court of  Justice
further extended the outreach of  its supremacy doctrine to require EU’s supremacy
not only over domestic statutes but also over domestic constitutions. In the Court’s
words:
[E]very national court must, in a case within its jurisdiction, apply Community
law in its entirety and protect rights which the latter confers on individuals and
must accordingly set aside any provision of  national law which may conflict
with it, whether prior or subsequent to the Community rule.4
Furthermore, this excerpt also forces domestic judiciaries to act as agents of
the EU, thus helping EU law to have effect in the Member States’ legal orders. This
idea of  institutional agency had previously been suggested in the context of
international law by George Scelle, a prominent French public international law
scholar. He envisioned international law as being effective only if  domestic
institutions split their roles in a way that allows them to act both as agents of  their
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2 Case 26/62, Judgment of  5 February 1963, Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend
en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, [1963] ECR 1.
3 Case 6/64, Judgment of  15 July 1964, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, [1964] ECR 585.
4 Case 106/77, Judgment of  9 March 1978, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA,
[1978] ECR 629, para 21 (emphasis added).
national legal orders, catering to the interests and public good of  their own state,
and as agents of  the international legal order, enabling international law to have
effect domestically.5 Essentially the same reasoning applies to the functions of
Member-State institutions in giving effect to EU law.
One might argue that the aforesaid doctrines that decouple EU law from
international law and place it hierarchically above domestic law are merely the view
of  the European Court of  Justice. Nonetheless, by ratifying the founding treaties,
the Member States have accepted that this Court, at the request of  national courts
or tribunals, should inter alia give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of  primary
EU law.6 Despite this, the supremacy of  EU law over national constitutional law is
still contested by the constitutional courts of  some Member States. Possibly the
most notable example thereof  is the decision of  the German Federal Constitutional
Court on the Lisbon Treaty, in which it decided that as long as the EU is based on
the principle of  conferral the democratic legitimacy for European integration must
first and foremost flow from national parliaments, in this particular case from the
Bundestag, the directly elected lower house of  the German Parliament.7 The French
Conseil constitutionnel, in its own judgment on the Lisbon Treaty, affirmed two
important principles: (a) that the constituent power recognised the existence of  a
Community legal order that is integrated into domestic law and distinct from
international law; but also (b) that the French Constitution remains “at the summit
of  the domestic legal order”.8 In these forms, a smack of  dualism between the EU
and the Member States continues to be felt.
Notwithstanding the continuing resistance of  some of  the Member States to
cede authority over their constitutional law, it is fairly unchallenged that in general
terms the EU enjoys the kind of  prevalence over national law that is unmatched in
other legal systems that have spawned beyond the legal boundaries of  the nation
state. Even though there are some compelling arguments to the contrary,9 EU law
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5 Cassese, Antonio. “Remarks on Scelle’s theory of  ‘role splitting’ (dédoublement fonctionnel) in
international law,” European Journal of  International Law, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1990: 213. See also: Scelle, George.
Précis de droit des gens: principes et systématique, Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1932-1934.
6 Article 19(3)(b) of  the Treaty on European Union (TEU).
7 Jančić, Davor. “Caveats from Karlsruhe and Berlin: whither democracy after Lisbon?,” Columbia
Journal of  European Law, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2010: 355. See also: Murkens, Jo Eric Khushal. “’We want our
identity back’ – the revival of  national sovereignty in the German Federal Constitutional Court’s
decision on the Lisbon Treaty,” Public Law, July 2010: 530-550; Schorkopf, Frank. “The European
Union as an association of  sovereign states: Karlsruhe’s ruling on the Treaty of  Lisbon,” German Law
Journal, Vol. 10, No. 8, 2009: 1219–1240; Schönberger, Christoph. “Lisbon in Karlsruhe:
Maastricht’s epigones at sea,” German Law Journal, Vol. 10, No. 8, 2009: 1201–1218.
8 Décision no. 2007-560 DC du 20 décembre 2007, Traité de Lisbonne, paras 7 and 8 respectively. See further:
Roux, Jérôme. “Le Conseil constitutionnel et le contrôle de constitutionnalité du Traité de Lisbonne: bis
repetita? A propos de la décision no. 2007-560 DC du 20 décembre 2007,” Revue Trimestrielle de Droit
Européen, 2008, Vol. 44, No. 1, 2008: 5–27; Chaltiel, Florence. “La ratification du traité de Lisbonne par
la France,” Revue du Marché Commun et de l’Union Européenne, No. 518, 2008: 277–280.
9 See: Hartley, Trevor C. “The constitutional foundations of  the European Union,” Law Quarterly
Review, Vol. 117, 2001: 225–246.
as a variant of  international law has long been debunked and no longer represents
an accurate description of  Europe’s juridical and constitutional reality. One of  the
European Union’s principal merits in both ideological and pragmatic respects is the
birth of  the idea that individual states are not only insufficient vehicles for securing
the well-being of  their citizens but also that their cooperation on the basis of
competing national sovereignties frequently yields suboptimal outcomes. The logic
of  placing the monopoly of  deciding the domestic status of  exogenous law in the
hands of  a single political community has been abandoned in favour of  the logic
of  pluralism. The latter logic posits that both exogenous and endogenous legal
sources may equally require obedience to certain behavioural prescriptions contained
in law.10 Translated to EU constitutionalism, this means that both the EU and its
Member States may rightfully and independently claim legal authority in regulating
certain aspects of  life. As the 2008 Kadi judgment of  the European Court of  Justice
demonstrates with the example of  the EU’s implementation of  UN Security
Council sanctions against individuals, the EU has advanced to the stage where it
itself  claims the right to fence itself  off  from international law in what could be
likened to the dualist principle.11
These considerations about the diminishing relevance of  viewing EU law
through international law spectacles emphatically apply to the principles of  monism
and dualism, which states use to specify the status of  international law in their legal
orders. While dualism requires the intervention of  parliament for international law
to be incorporated in the domestic legal order, monism does not. In monist states,
the very act of  parliamentary approval of  the ratification of  a treaty suffices and
no further action is requisite for international law to be applicable in such a state.
Conversely, in dualist states, parliament needs to transpose international legal
provisions into domestic law for them to have effect and be applied to individual
legal addressees. 
Although of  fundamental importance in the field of  international law, the
concepts of  monism and dualism have lost virtually any meaning in the multilevel
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10 See for instance: Walker, Neil. “The idea of  constitutional pluralism,” Modern Law Review, Vol. 65,
No. 3, 2002: 317–359; Sweet, Alec Stone. “Constitutionalism, legal pluralism, and international regimes,”
Indiana Journal of  Global Legal Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2009: 621–645; Itzcovich, Giulio. “Legal order, legal
pluralism, fundamental principles. Europe and its law in three concepts,” European Law Journal, Vol. 18,
No. 3, 2012: 358–384.
11 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Judgment of  3 September 2008, Yassin Abdullah Kadi
and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of  the European Union and Commission of  the European
Communities, [2008] ECR I–6351. See different views on this issue in: Búrca, Gráinne de. “The
European Court of  Justice and the international legal order after Kadi,” Harvard International Law
Journal, Vol. 51, No. 1, 2010: 3; Kokott, Juliane and Sobotta, Christoph. “The Kadi case – constitutional
core values and international law – finding the balance?,” European Journal of  International Law, Vol. 23,
No. 4, 2012: 1017; Isiksel, Türküler. “Fundamental rights in the EU after Kadi and Al Barakaat,”
European Law Journal, Vol. 16, No. 5, 2010: 559; Griller, Stefan. “International law, human rights and
the European Community’s autonomous legal order: notes on the European Court of  Justice decision
in Kadi,” European Constitutional Law Review, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2008: 552.
legal system of the European Union. Although binding legal force has been endowed
on both EU regulations and directives as two most important legislative instruments
of  the Union, regulations are binding directly and in their entirety without the need
to transpose them, while directives are binding as to the result to be achieved leaving
it to the authorities of  the Member States to choose the form and method of  their
internalisation.12 Accordingly, Member States can freely opt to transpose directives by
statutory or regulatory action, of  which the former type of  action preserves a portion
of the otherwise severely limited room for parliamentary manoeuvre. However, the
necessity of  transposing directives is a requirement of  EU law and not of  domestic
law, which would be necessary for the EU to be depicted as a dualist constitutional
space. The fact that it was the Member States which created primary EU law in the
first place is solely an indirect argument and would not be sufficient to challenge the
thesis that the legal system of the EU is predominantly monist, though dualist reflexes
subsist. What is crucial here is that national parliaments have lost their legislative power
in the areas where the EU is empowered to act.
II EU Treaties under the parliamentary scanners: 
the case of  the Treaty of  Lisbon
The role of  parliaments in domesticating international law is nevertheless
paramount. Whether monist or dualist, national parliaments have a basic linkage
with international law insofar as they are asked to approve the ratification of  treaties
entered into by their state. Unless a referendum is organised, the act of  parliamentary
approval is what equips international agreements with the democratic legitimacy
necessary for their popular acceptance and the authority to regulate the agreed
segments of  the internal policies of  a state.
The founding and amending treaties of  the EU indeed have a special status, as it
is possible to revise them without the Member States having to ratify such a revision
in accordance with their constitutional requirements. Such simplified treaty revision
procedures, also known as bridging clauses or passerelles, are carried out by the
European Council while concomitantly leaving the possibility for each national
parliament to voice their opposition and thus block such a course of  action. Treaty
amendments pursuant to the bridging clauses can be used to loosen the conditions
applicable to secondary EU lawmaking, thus making it possible for the EU legislature
to act by a qualified majority instead of  by unanimity and in accordance with the
ordinary legislative procedure instead of  in accordance with the special legislative
procedure.13 However, the scope of  simplified treaty amendments is restricted and
they cannot exact changes of  the magnitude typically produced by the ordinary treaty
revision procedure, which continues to require unanimous ratification by all Member
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13 Article 48(7) TEU.
States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements before they can
become effective.14 This means that the most comprehensive modifications in the
European Union’s juridico-political setup are still filtered through national parliaments.
In truth, such parliamentary filtering is often nothing more than an act of
rubberstamping the fait accompli negotiated and brought home by the government.
Even so, all parliamentarians and legislative bodies within parliaments, including
committees and the plenary, have a chance to appraise the advantages and
disadvantages of  the arrangements agreed to by their state in the international arena
and thereby help legitimise or delegitimise them in a public forum according to the
political preferences of  the citizens, whom they represent.
In light of  the foregoing, this chapter examines the consequences of  the
changed legal landscape brought about by the process of  European integration for
the national parliaments of  the EU Member States. This landscape for the first time
addresses the very actors that are called upon to approve it – national parliaments.
The Lisbon Treaty has indeed introduced a host of  new powers for the national
parliaments’ participation in EU decision making.15 The most important among
these powers is that of  monitoring the EU’s compliance with the principle of
subsidiarity when drafting EU legislation in the fields of  shared competences,
regarding which both the EU and the Member States are entitled to act.16 The
subsidiarity principle calls for EU action to be undertaken “only if  and in so far as
the objectives of  the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member
States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason
of  the scale or effects of  the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level”.17
The policing of  this principle is carried out prior to the onset of  the applicable
decision-making procedure at the EU level by requesting national parliaments to
sift through draft EU legislative initiatives, which are as a rule prepared by the
Commission, and decide whether any such initiative infringes subsidiarity. If  any
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14 Article 48(1)-(5) TEU.
15 See for instance: Barrett, Gavin. “‘The King is dead, long live the King’: the recasting by the Treaty
of  Lisbon of  the provisions of  the Constitutional Treaty concerning national parliaments,” European
Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2008: 66-84; Cygan, Adam. “The role of  national parliaments in the EU’s new
constitutional order,” in European Union Law for the twenty-first century: rethinking the new legal order Vol. 1, by
Takis Tridimas and Paolisa Nebbia (eds), Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004: 153-169; Kiiver, Philipp.
“European Treaty reform and the national parliaments: towards a new assessment of parliament-friendly
Treaty provisions,” in European constitutionalism beyond Lisbon, by Jan Wouters et al. (eds), Antwerp:
Intersentia, 2009: 131-146; Passos, Ricardo. “Recent developments concerning the role of  national
parliaments in the European Union,” ERA Forum, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2008: 25-40.
16 See analyses hereof in: Louis, Jean-Victor. “The Lisbon Treaty: The Irish ‘No’. National parliaments
and the principle of  subsidiarity – legal options and practical limits,” European Constitutional Law Review,
Vol. 4, No. 3, 2008: 429-452; Schütze, Robert. “Subsidiarity after Lisbon: reinforcing the safeguards of
federalism?,” Cambridge Law Journal, Vol. 68, No. 3, 2009: 525–536; Kiiver, Philipp. The early warning system
for the principle of  subsidiarity: constitutional theory and empirical reality, London: Routledge, 2012; Cooper, Ian.
“The watchdogs of  subsidiarity: national parliaments and the logic of  arguing in the EU,” Journal of
Common Market Studies, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2006: 281-304.
17 Article 5(3) TEU.
such infringement is detected, a reasoned opinion will be issued to the Commission,
the European Parliament and the Council. Each Member State is granted two votes.
The main drawback of  this so-called early warning mechanism is that only the votes
aggregated above the prescribed thresholds, which are commonly referred to as
yellow and orange cards, will thwart the EU decision-making procedure.18 Yet as a
post facto instrument, any national parliament or a chamber thereof  may request the
national government to bring an action before the European Court of  Justice
against an already enacted piece of  EU legislation if  it is deemed that it violates
subsidiarity.19 Also of  constitutional significance is the treaty provision requiring
national parliaments to contribute to the good functioning of  the Union,20 which,
due to its vagueness and seemingly imperative tone, has sparked different
parliamentary reactions.
In order to assess the degree to which the monist and dualist reasonings still
resonate in the EU Member States, this chapter inquires about the inherent
functions of  national parliaments in the European Union. This chapter tests
whether parliaments oppose or embrace their inclusion under the EU umbrella as
compensation for the decline of  their legislative influence in areas where the Union
may act. Therefore, we seek insight into whether these parliaments accept or reject
their constitutional roles to be split so that besides their domestic duties, they also
perform as agents of  the EU. Their acceptance of  role-splitting would signify that
they have reconciled to the fact that the EU is a monist legal structure.
To these ends, we delve into the national parliaments’ claims about their own
role in EU affairs, which were made during the procedures of  approving the
ratification of  the Lisbon Treaty. A qualitative empirical analysis is carried out by
examining the arguments made by major political parties in favour or against three
Lisbon Treaty provisions that carry most implications for national parliaments: (a)
subsidiarity monitoring; (b) contribution to the good functioning of  the Union; and
(c) the extension of  codecision by means of  depillarisation (transfer of  the former
Third Pillar to the First Pillar), which benefits the European Parliament and
indirectly reveals whether national parliaments perceive their newly empowered
EU-level counterpart as an institutional rival or a potential partner. Such an approach
reveals the role perceptions of  national parliaments towards their incorporation
into the Union’s constitutional order as a means of  rectifying the loss of  powers
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See various views on this matter in: Jančić, Davor. “Representative democracy across levels? National
parliaments and EU constitutionalism,” Croatian Yearbook of  European Law and Policy, Vol. 8, 2012: 
227–265; Fabbrini, Federico and Granat, Katarzyna. “‘Yellow card, but no foul’: The role of  the
national parliaments under the subsidiarity protocol and the Commission proposal for an EU
regulation on the right to strike,” Common Market Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2013: 115–144; Wyatt,
Derrick. “Could a ‘yellow card’ for national parliaments strengthen judicial and political policing of
subsidiarity?,” Croatian Yearbook of  European Law and Policy, Vol. 2, 2006: 1-17.
19 Article 8 the Protocol on the application of  the principles of  subsidiarity and proportionality.
20 Article 12 TEU.
suffered in successive treaty amendments, which would not have occurred had the
EU been a typical international law creation.
Yet before embarking on this analysis, one is compelled to do justice to the
argument that the way in which parliaments understand their position vis-à-vis the
EU and vis-à-vis their own direct involvement within it may depend on the domestic
constitutional idiosyncrasies, which we address in the following heading.
III Two distinct constitutional legacies: 
the British and French models
Analysis in this chapter is limited to the national parliaments of  the United
Kingdom and France.21 Whereas these two parliaments certainly cannot be held to
represent all 27 Member-State parliaments, they do stand for two distinct systems
of  government, two distinct approaches to international law, and two distinct
approaches to the constitutional role of  parliament.
1. System of  government
While Britain is a monarchy featuring a parliamentary system of  government
in the legal environment engendered by an uncodified constitution, France is a
republic with a semi-presidential system operating under the terms of  a codified
constitution. Parliamentary elections in Britain directly determine the personality
who will occupy the prime ministerial post, whereas in France it is the President of
the Republic who decides who the Prime Minister will be.22 Doubtlessly, the French
President would need to pay heed to the political composition of  the Lower House
of  Parliament, Assemblée nationale, so as to avoid having his Prime Minister ousted
if  the person appointed runs into a hostile parliamentary majority.
2. Approach to international and EU law
Britain’s dualism contrasts with France’s monism. For individuals to be able to
rely on the legal protection afforded by international agreements acceded to by Britain,
the Westminster Parliament must first transpose their provisions into British law.23
With respect to the EU, this was done in 1972 by virtue of a general enabling provision
brought to life by the parliamentary adoption of  the European Communities Act.
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short name for the UK is Britain. Britain is therefore a more encompassing term than Great Britain.
22 Article 8 of  the French Constitution.
23 Feldman, David. “Monism, dualism and constitutional legitimacy,” Australian Yearbook of  International
Law, Vol. 20, 1999: 105.
This Act provides for the direct effect and enforceability of  EU law throughout the
United Kingdom without any further enactment.24 No such thing is necessary in
France, because its Constitution, subject to the condition of  reciprocity, makes the
provisions of  treaties that have been duly ratified or approved directly applicable in
the French legal order and even allows them to prevail over French statutes by giving
them a higher rank (autorité supérieure).25 In addition, The French Constitution obliges
France to participate in the EU as ordained by the Lisbon Treaty.26
3. Constitutional role of  Parliament
The prominence of  the British doctrine of  parliamentary sovereignty exists in
stark opposition to the French doctrine of  ‘rationalised parliament’ (parlementarisme
rationalisé). In theory, the UK Parliament is omnipotent, its powers are unlimited
and it can make and unmake any law whatever. Because of  this legislative supremacy,
Acts of  Parliament may not be reviewed by any person or body outside Parliament.27
To the contrary, the French Parliament may only do what the Constitution allows
it to do. Among the key aspects of  such a harnessing of  Parliament is the fact that
it may only legislate in constitutionally enumerated policy fields, that it operates
under the dominance of  the Government, and that its acts may be reviewed for
conformity with the constitution under the conditions specified in the
Constitution.28 The balancing of  the institutions towards a better equilibrium
between the Government and Parliament was only implemented in 2008 by means
of  a constitutional amendment.29
Having set the theoretical and methodological stage, the headings that follow
present the empirical analysis outlined above. It is important to note that the statuses
of  the persons and political parties mentioned refer to those that they held at the
moment about which we write, which may differ from their present status.
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24 Section 2(1) thereof  reads: “All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time
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time provided for by or under the Treaties, as in accordance with the Treaties are without further
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25 Article 55 of  the French Constitution.
26 Article 88(1) of  the French Constitution reads: “The Republic shall participate in the European
Union constituted by States which have freely chosen to exercise some of  their powers in common by
virtue of  the Treaty on European Union and of  the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union,
as they result from the treaty signed in Lisbon on 13 December, 2007” (emphasis added). 
27 See among many accounts: Goldsworthy, Jeffrey. Parliamentary sovereignty: contemporary debates,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
28 See a succinct account in: Avril, Pierre. “Le parlementarisme rationalisé.” Revue du Droit Public, Vol.
114, No. 5-6, 1998: 1507–1515.
29 Dord, Olivier. “Vers un rééquilibrage des pouvoirs publics en faveur du Parlement,” Revue Française
de Droit Constitutionnel, No. 77, 2009/1: 99–118.
IV The United Kingdom: 
a cautious but assiduous scrutineer
Britain ratified the Lisbon Treaty on 16 July 2008.30 Despite the insistence of  the
Conservative Party (Con) on a referendum, the approval was by Parliament. Court
cases challenging the ratification method brought by Stuart Wheeler and William Cash
were unsuccessful.31 The House of  Commons approved the Lisbon Treaty on 11
March 2008, followed by the House of  Lords’ approval on 18 June 2008. 
That political accountability is a serious concern in Westminster is vindicated
by an early reaction of  the Chairman of  the Foreign Affairs Committee of  the
House of  Commons to the Government’s failure to appear before it and give
evidence clarifying its negotiation positions: “the Committee regards the refusal of
the FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Office] to provide a Minister to give oral
evidence during this crucial phase of  the discussions on the future of  Europe as a
failure of  accountability to Parliament”.32 The reason for pressing for a prior
parliamentary consultation was to enable it “to make an input into the contents of
the Treaty through the Government”.33 The House of  Commons’ European
Scrutiny Committee, for its part, complained about the lack of  transparency of  the
Lisbon Treaty negotiations and held that “the process could not have been better
designed to marginalise the role of  national parliaments and to curtail public
debate”.34
1. Subsidiarity monitoring
Subsidiarity was one of  the six guiding principles of  the British Government
in negotiations with the German Presidency on what became the Lisbon Treaty.35
As shown below, the monitoring of  subsidiarity has been extensively analysed by
both Houses of  Parliament.
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House of  Commons, Debate of  5 December 2006, Vol. 454, cols. 10-11WS.
Reacting to the Commission’s communication on the Union’s reform published
some fortnight before the opening of  the intergovernmental conference (IGC),36 the
House of  Commons’ European Scrutiny Committee doubted the possibility of  any
meaningful parliamentary input in subsidiarity issues without independence from
Government whipping systems.37 This Committee sought clarifications on the
Government’s White Paper on the IGC, which marked subsidiarity control as a matter
of  priority and argued that, since national parliaments would be given a “direct say in
the EU’s lawmaking procedures for the first time”, the Union would assume a duty
to consult national parliaments.38 The Government considered it “unlikely” to whip
MPs within the framework of  the early warning mechanism and, instead, offered to
work with Parliament “to help both Houses exercise this independent power”.39 More
specifically, during a hearing in the House of  Lords’ EU Committee, Lord Rosser, a
peer of  the Labour Party (Lab), raised the crucial question of  whether any proposal
of  that House would have to enjoy the support of  the Government of  the day if  it
were to have any real impact on EU legislation. Jim Murphy, the Minister of  Europe,
replied in the negative but warned that this ‘concession’ would not extend to initiating
EU legislation but only to responding and objecting to it.40
Welcoming the early warning mechanism, the House of  Lords’ EU Committee
conceded that the yellow and orange cards will seldom be invoked, but also rightly
stressed that:
[T]his is true of  many of  the sanctions available to scrutineers in a democracy.
The existence of  a sanction gives scrutiny teeth, while making it less likely that
the sanction will need to be deployed. The Commission can disregard adverse
votes from national parliaments and maintain its proposal; but this may be
politically difficult […].41
The House of  Commons’ European Scrutiny Committee emphasised that,
while rare, subsidiarity problems do occasionally arise.42 Parliaments might also
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37 House of  Commons, European Scrutiny Committee, “European Union Intergovernmental
Conference”, HC 1014, 35th Report of  Session 2006-07 of 9 October 2007, para. 19, p. 8. See also ibid,
para. 38, p. 13.
38 British Government, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “The Reform Treaty: the British
approach to the European Union Intergovernmental Conference”, Cm 7174, 23.07.2007, pp. 11–12.
39 House of  Commons, European Scrutiny Committee, “European Union Intergovernmental
Conference: Government responses”, HC 179, First Special Report of  Session 2007-08 of 17 December
2007, p. 4.
40 House of  Lords, EU Committee, “Initiation of  EU legislation”, HL Paper 150, Minutes of  Evidence
of  4 June 2008, QQ471 and 472, Ev. p. 123.
41 House of  Lords, EU Committee, “The Treaty of  Lisbon: an impact assessment – Vol. I: Report”,
HL Paper 62-I, 10th Report of  Session 2007-08 of 13 March 2008, para. 11.50, p. 244.
42 For example, the House of  Commons found that the draft Decision making 2010 the European
Year for combating poverty and social exclusion, proposed by the Commission in December 2007, 
object to EU initiatives on the ground of  sovereignty, but in such cases the early
warning mechanism would not apply.43 It further assessed that the possibilities
offered by the early warning mechanism “add very little by way of  democratic
control over the Commission and the EU institutions” due to high thresholds
needed to halt the Commission’s intention to proceed with a legislative proposal.
If  this mechanism was to have “any real utility”, the thresholds had to be much
lower.44 Despite these shortcomings, Lord Grenfell (Lab), the Chairman of  the
House of  Lords’ EU Committee, reassured his fellow peers that the yellow and
orange cards “enhance the direct involvement of  national parliaments in EU
legislative procedures”.45
Yet, in a fairly heated committee hearing, Commission Vice-President
Wallström told the House of  Commons that the Commission should listen to
the views of  national parliaments even if  the number of  votes did not reach the
threshold.46 This informal political undertaking on the part of  the Commission
was a product of  pressure by the European Scrutiny Committee members on a
range of  subsidiarity-related questions, which led the Commissioner constantly
to justify the extent and quality of  the Union’s legislative activity. For example,
when asked why the Commission unabatedly furthers initiatives that often seem
remote, unnecessary and expensive, Commissioner Wallström assumed a
defensive stance:
[W]e have to be more effective and spend money in a way which shows the added
value of  Europe. So I can only agree that you will probably find examples of  this,
but it does not say that we are not carrying out sort of  good impact assessments,
so that we are not improving things. I think we can show that we have improved
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violated subsidiarity because it required the appointment of  representatives of  national parliaments to
the National Advisory Groups for organising the Year. This prescription contravened the right of
parliaments to regulate their own affairs. The House then asked the minister in charge of  the matter to
discuss this point with the Commission and other Member States in the Council. As a result, the
problematic provision was stricken out. House of  Commons, European Scrutiny Committee,
“Subsidiarity, national parliaments and the Lisbon Treaty”, HC 563, 33rd Report of  Session 2007-08 of 21
October 2008, paras 29-31, pp. 9-10. As further successful invocations of  subsidiarity, the British
Government singled out two examples. The first one concerns tax, when Britain succeeded in arguing
that the 2003 Commission proposal to abolish the British VAT zero rates on food, children’s clothing
and other products was inconsistent with subsidiarity. The second one occurred in the field of  labour
law, when Britain successfully argued, following a 2006 Commission report to determine the steps needed
to be taken in this field at the European level, that no new EU legislation was necessary. House of  Lords,
EU Committee, “Subsidiarity, national parliaments and the Lisbon Treaty: Government response”, HC
197, First Special Report of  Session 2008–09 of 26 January 2009, p. 3.
43 House of  Commons, European Scrutiny Committee, “Subsidiarity, national parliaments and the
Lisbon Treaty”, HC 563, 33rd Report of  Session 2007-08 of 21 October 2008, para. 30, pp. 10.
44 House of  Commons, European Scrutiny Committee, “European Union Intergovernmental
Conference”, HC 1014, 35th Report of  Session 2006-07 of 9 October 2007, para. 68, p. 23.
45 House of  Lords, Debate of  5 December 2007, Vol. 696, col. 1735.
46 House of  Commons, European Scrutiny Committee, “Subsidiarity, national parliaments and the
Lisbon Treaty”, HC 563, Oral evidence of  23 June 2008, Q86, p. Ev 21.
our own impact assessment and the subsidiarity test, and this will be even better
with national parliaments keeping control also over what we are doing.47
As regards the Barroso Initiative, the Commission gave a seemingly clear
statement of  its purpose in a hearing before the House of  Lords’ EU Committee.
As Christian Leffler, Head of  Cabinet to Commissioner Wallström, explained:
It is not an attempt to somehow circumvent established procedures, to go
behind the back of  the Council, of  governments in the Council and enlist the
support of  their national parliaments, or to go behind the back of  the European
Parliament. It is a way of  trying to offer a dialogue which will allow national
parliaments to be better informed and more actively engaged at an early stage
in the preparation and formation of  European policy so that they are better
placed to engage in the dialogue at national level with their governments […]
to make sure that they fully represent their national positions because those
national positions will have been built on the input of  well-informed
parliaments.48
As a matter of  fact, Westminster advocated the enshrinement of  this broad
political dialogue in the Lisbon Treaty from the very start of  intergovernmental
negotiations.49 When this did not materialise, it was argued that the Barroso Initiative
should be kept alongside the early warning mechanism, even though documents
received from the Commission are “not usually used in the scrutiny process”
because they only arrive shortly before the Government sends them.50 Nevertheless,
Lord Grenfell (Lab) stressed that the Barroso Initiative “in a certain sense could be
more valuable to national parliaments than what is in the Treaty […]”.51 In addition
to the Barroso Initiative, the House of  Lords has also, on its own initiative, began
sending to the Commission those of  its reports that recommend action or restraint
by the Commission, and the Commission has responded in each case.52
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48 House of  Lords, EU Committee, “The EU Reform Treaty: work in progress”, HL Paper 180,
Minutes of  Evidence of  19 September 2007, Q55, pp. 14-15.
49 See the statement to that effect by Lord Grenfell (Lab) in: House of  Lords, EU Committee,
“Evidence from the Minister for Europe on the June European Council and the 2007 Inter-
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50 House of  Lords, EU Committee, “The EU Reform Treaty: work in progress”, HL Paper 180, 35th
Report of  Session 2006-07 of 1 November 2007, paras 34 and 55, pp. 10 and 14.
51 House of  Lords, EU Committee, “The Treaty of  Lisbon: an impact assessment – Vol. II:
Evidence”, HL Paper 62-II, Minutes of  Evidence of  6 December 2007, Q190, p. S49.
52 House of  Lords, EU Committee, “The Treaty of  Lisbon: an impact assessment – Vol. I: Report”,
HL Paper 62-I, 10th Report of  Session 2007-08 of 13 March 2008, para. 11.21, p. 283. In an intervention on
the floor of  the House, Lord Grenfell (Lab) stated that this practice is “as yet modest”, but that the
Commission’s responses are “prompt and thoughtful”. Direct correspondence is with Commission Vice-
President in charge of  relations with national parliaments. House of  Lords, Debates of  5 December
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Though influence is hard to measure, this Committee received evidence from
the UK Permanent Representation in Brussels that the House of  Lords’ reports
are “well regarded” in the European Parliament, that the British Government takes
them into account in formulating and developing policy, and that the Commission
might be influenced “to a degree”. It was duly acknowledged, however, that the
voice of  a single parliament, being one of  many seeking to influence legislation,
should not be exaggerated.53 One of  the suggestions that attracted attention was to
concentrate on multi-annual programmes, such as Commission work programmes
and policy strategies.54
2. Good functioning of  the Union
Both Houses of  the British Parliament found it rather serious that the Lisbon
Treaty’s provision on national parliamentary contribution to the good functioning
of  the Union contained the phrase “shall contribute”, because this wording
appeared to place a legal obligation directly on national parliaments.55 They were
resolute that this Treaty provision can only be understood as entitling national
parliaments to act and not as obliging them to undertake any positive action. Their
argument was that the British Parliament has full competence to decide whether it
wishes to use the rights listed in this provision.56 Any legal obligation on Westminster
is out of  question. In particular, two considerations ignited the concern of  the
House of  Commons’ European Scrutiny Committee: (a) national parliaments,
Davor Jančić14
53 House of  Lords, EU Committee, “Initiation of  EU legislation”, HL Paper 150, 22nd Report of
Session 2007-08 of  24 July 2008, para. 126, p. 39. When asked whether the reports of  the House of
Lords have impact in Brussels, Jim Murphy, the Minister for Europe, stated as an example of  influence
the Report on the wholesale prices of  roaming charges on mobile phones: “It is now part of  the
established orthodoxy that your Lordships’ reflections on that had an impact on the Commission,
and a really effective impact”. The Minister did not, however, specify what the impact consisted in.
House of  Lords, EU Committee, “Initiation of  EU legislation”, HL Paper 150, Minutes of  Evidence of
4 June 2008, Q465, p. 122. For its part, the Commission mainly agreed with their Lordships’
observations stating that they “have retained our fullest attention”. See the letter by Commissioner
Wallström of  30 May 2007, reproduced in: House of  Lords, EU Committee, “Government and
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54 House of  Lords, EU Committee, “Initiation of  EU legislation”, HL Paper 150, 22nd Report of
Session 2007-08 of  24 July 2008, para. 160, pp. 49. See to that effect the evidence given by Catherine
Day, the Secretary General of  Commission Secretariat (Q365, p. 95) and the statement by the
Chairman of  the Committee: “I think we would be interested to know whether there is more scope
for actually influencing what proposals come forward” (Q468, p. 123) in: ibid, Minutes of  Evidence of  8
May 2008.
55 House of  Lords, EU Committee, “The EU Reform Treaty: work in progress”, HL Paper 180, 35th
Report of  Session 2006-07 of 1 November 2007, para. 29, p. 9; See the linguistic analysis of  the “shall” in:
House of  Lords, EU Committee, “The Treaty of  Lisbon: an impact assessment – Vol. I: Report”, HL
Paper 62-I, 10th Report of  Session 2007-08 of 13 March 2008, Appendix 4, p. 293.
56 House of  Commons, European Scrutiny Committee, “European Union Intergovernmental
Conference”, HC 1014, 35th Report of  Session 2006-07 of 9 October 2007, paras 69 and 70, p. 23.
unlike the European Parliament, are not creations of  the Treaties and their rights
are not dependent on them; and (b) if  national parliaments were to be placed under
a duty to act, this would be enforceable before the Court of  Justice and that would
conflict with the 1688 Bill of  Rights, which prevents parliamentary debates and
proceedings from being questioned in any place out of  Parliament.57
Besides many other parliamentarians, Gisela Stuart MEP (Lab), who was a
Presidium member of  and UK Parliamentary Representative to the Convention on
the Future of  Europe, also rejected the possibility of  any EU-imposed duty on
Westminster because it conflicts with parliamentary sovereignty, whereby no
Parliament can bind successor Parliaments.58 The same type of  concern was voiced
about the imperative form “shall” used in the Lisbon Treaty’s provisions providing
for national parliaments to ensure compliance with the principle of  subsidiarity and
for the European Parliament and national parliaments jointly to determine the
organisation of interparliamentary cooperation.59 In response, the Government firmly
assured Parliament that there was no policy intention of  obliging national parliaments
and that the problem was one of  drafting rather than of  intent.60 After it had
negotiated the amendment of the wording, the finally adopted Lisbon Treaty dropped
the “shall” forms, albeit not in the case of interparliamentary cooperation. The House
of  Lords’ EU Committee then declared the matter settled, underscoring that the
nature of  parliamentary contribution to the Union’s good functioning is that of  a
“strong political obligation to take seriously” the new Lisbon Treaty powers.61
3. Extension of  codecision
The rise in the European Parliament’s power of  codecision, not least due to
the transfer of  the Third Pillar to the First Pillar, was embraced mainly by the
Labourites and Liberal Democrats (LibDem). The Conservatives and the UK
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Independence Party (UKIP) were not as enchanted. The following two examples
illustrate this very well.
In a House of  Lords plenary debate preceding the European Council meeting
of  13–14 December 2007, when the Heads of  State and Government signed the
Treaty of  Lisbon, Lord Harrison (Lab) was forthright in his call that “[w]e should
celebrate the extension of  codecision-making […and that] we should not hide the
increasing of  the democratic element of  the European institutions under a bushel”.62
In contrast, Lord Blackwell (Con) expressed concern about “the gradual evolution
of the institutional structure of  the European Union away from nation states, [which
is] slowly but surely building and reinforcing the idea of  democratic legitimacy
exercised independently of  the nation state by European-level institutions”.63
Several months later, during the House of  Commons plenary debate on the
European Union (Amendment) Bill held in February 2008, Labour MPs defended
the standpoint that the Union’s “democratic legitimacy is improving and increasing”
because directly elected MEPs gain a greater say through the extended application of
codecision. The European Parliament, a consultative body in 1979, becomes “a
colegislative body now, and that is a tremendous step forward in democratic terms”.64
This was squarely opposed by Conservative MPs, who saw the empowerment of  the
European Parliament as a ‘conspiracy’ against British democracy:
The problem is that it is all part of  the process of  greater integration, with
more centralisation and less democracy. The European Parliament is involved
in certain areas of  codecision, but that only serves to lock down and contain member
states’ national parliaments. We are in the ridiculous situation of  being invited to
congratulate the EU on allowing national parliaments to be involved. General
elections take place on a national basis, but the process of  making laws is being
handed over to the undemocratic procedure that I have set out. That is the
system in which we are effectively imprisoned.65
Significantly, neither the Conservative nor the Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs
accepted the diminution in national parliaments’ powers because of the strengthening
of those of  the European Parliament. The only difference is that the Labourites and
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Liberal Democrats espoused a two-channel scheme of  European accountability,
whereby EU decisions would be accounted for in both the European Parliament and
national parliaments, whereas the Conservatives attached considerably less importance
to the role of  the European Parliament. Replying to a question by Peter Bone MP
(Con) on this specific issue, Mike Gapes MP (Lab) explained:
The real question that we have as parliamentarians is how we can make the
Commission and the Council of  Ministers more accountable to parliaments in
the 27 Member States and in the common European Parliament. It is not about
centralisation or taking powers away from parliaments; if  anything, it is about
taking power away from unelected bureaucrats and civil servants.66
The reason why the Labourites adopted this position lies, as their member Mark
Hendrick MP argued, in the principle of  popular representation: “Directly elected
parliaments, whether we are talking about the House of  Commons or the European
Parliament, contain the representatives of  the people who are closest to the people”.67
Notwithstanding the European Parliament’s enhanced posture, there was a
palpable consensus that the British Parliament’s performance of  the constitutional
function of  political accountability should be preserved and burnished to
accommodate the post-Lisbon decision-making environment. The House of  Lords’
EU Committee corroborated this with the examples of  agriculture and fisheries. It
was argued that the move to codecision in these two fields in fact facilitated national
parliamentary scrutiny. Namely, evidence given to Parliament by expert witnesses
showed that the decisions in this field had been made opaquely, allowing agriculture
ministers to operate as a “collusive club with rather little external scrutiny and in a
way which was not very easy for national parliaments to get any handles on”.68 With
the European Parliament entering the decision-making scene, more information is
expected to be available and thus domestic parliamentary scrutiny could and should
be enhanced. Alhough one wonders whether such reasoning applies to other EU
policies, the logic is clear: even the enhancement of  powers of  directly elected
institutions entails responsibility. Effectively, the European Parliament and
Westminster do not exclude each other. If  the European Parliament’s increased
involvement underpins that of  national parliaments, then their action must be
viewed as complementary and not as conflicting.
That being so, the role of  national parliaments, according to Michael Connarty
MP (Lab) and the Chairman of  House of  Commons’ European Scrutiny
Committee, is not to communicate their views to the European Parliament in order
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for them to be impressed on the Commission and the Council, but to “focus on
making their Governments go to the Council and agree the right thing”.69 The
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats share his opinion. As David Heathcoat-
Amory MP (Con) stressed, “[t]he parliaments’ loss of  powers is shown by the
massive switch to qualified majority voting, which practically removes the veto
powers of  this House over such legislation”.70 For Lord Teverson (LibDem),
holding ministers to account for their activity in the Council is “a key way in which
national parliaments can control the European Union and it is a very powerful way
if  they do it properly”.71
The accountability role of  national parliaments was specifically underlined in
the field of  Common Foreign and Security Policy, where the European Parliament
does not codecide with the Council. Lord Roper (LibDem), the Chairman of
Subcommittee C on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Development Policy of  the
House of  Lords’ EU Committee describes this in the following words:
I was pleased that in his introduction, the noble Lord, Lord Bowness, referred
to the presence of  the High Representative and the Commissioner for External Relations at
the biennial meetings of  COFAC, the meeting bringing together the foreign affairs
chairmen of  the national parliaments. Their presence gives a reality to those
meetings and ensures that they are held to account by the national parliaments. That is
important because, in these areas of  intergovernmental cooperation, the national
parliaments have particular responsibility.72
In a recent statement, the Government concurred in this position declaring
that “[g]iven the intergovernmental nature of  the EU’s Common Security and
Defence Policy, we believe that this remains entirely a matter for national parliaments
and coordination between them. There is no reason and no case for the European
Parliament to expand its competence in this area”.73
Though primary, the political accountability of  the Government is not the only
and exclusive concern of  the British Parliament. The accountability of  the
Commission is, according to Lord Astor of  Hever (Con) also pertinent because:
In nation states, that power [of  legislative initiative] normally belongs to elected
governments, who change as voters decide. No such limit exists for the
Commission. This explains why dossiers tend to keep being pushed until the
other European institutions accept them. […] Yet perhaps the unhappy
disconnect between bottom-up democracy and the need for the Commission
to act impartially in the general European interest is irreconcilable. If  so, it
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makes it all the more important that national parliamentarians are scrupulous
in holding this power to account and making sure that scrutiny is maintained
to the utmost level.74
Finally, the increasing trend in the Union towards ‘first reading deals’ alerted
the House of  Lords, because this practice of  speedy decision making affects scrutiny
of  EU policy, which should not be overshadowed by the policing of  subsidiarity.75
V France: a founder with unabated zeal
France ratified the Lisbon Treaty on 14 February 2008.76 Just as the Maastricht
Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty had been ruled partially unconstitutional by the
abovementioned Conseil constitutionnel’s decision of  20 December 2007. The
Constitution was amended along the lines of  this decision on 4 February 2008. The
Houses of  Parliament then swiftly proceeded to authorise the ratification of  the
Lisbon Treaty on 7 February 2008. Below we analyse the parliamentary proceedings
that took place during the ratification approval process.
1. Subsidiarity monitoring
For the Assemblée nationale, the principle of  subsidiarity is a prime factor of  EU
legitimacy:
The respect for the principle of  subsidiarity realises the expectation of  ‘added
value’, expressed by many European citizens with regard to the European
Union. The latter must act in the domains where its intervention brings a
supplement of  efficiency and solidarity. It draws its legitimacy precisely from such
action. The capacity of  European institutions to prove the necessity of  their
action depends, thus, on the respect for the principle of  subsidiarity.77
To entrust EU institutions alone with the control of  subsidiarity would be
“illusory”, because a strict interpretation of  subsidiarity could reduce the scope of
their action and thus jeopardise their institutional interests.78 As regards reasoned
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opinions, they “will have real legal impact” since they may contribute to the blocking
of  a certain EU initiative.79 Yet, as senator Jean-Luc Mélenchon, member of  Parti
de gauche (PG) warned, nine Member States must join forces to effect the blockage,
while national parliaments are denied the right of  amendment.80
Subsidiarity actions before the European Court of  Justice were understood as a
prerogative of  Parliament. According to a statement made in 2005 by Dominique
Perben, former French Minister of  Justice, the Government could “neither oppose
nor be compelled to comply” with a request to transmit these actions to the Court of
Justice.81 To the contrary, the Assemblée nationale interpreted subsidiarity actions as a
“binding competence”.82 Yet the consensus within the ruling Union pour un Mouvement
Populaire (UMP) was not watertight. For instance, their MP Jacques Myard asserted
that reasoned opinions and subsidiarity actions are a negation of  national sovereignty,
because the Assemblée nationale, as a sovereign assembly, is authorised merely to give
non-binding opinions and is further subjugated to the Court of Justice over a principle
that is political rather than juridical in nature.83 However, the European Affairs
Committee of  the Assemblée nationale has rightly maintained that the real impact of
Parliament’s opinions lies in their political weight rather than in their legal nature.84
In the Sénat, the fact that national parliaments were recognised as petitioners
before the Court of  Justice was seen as a grand innovation of  the Lisbon Treaty.85
More broadly, as senator Hubert Haenel (UMP), the Chairman of  the Sénat’s
European Affairs Committee, pointed out: 
The role of  parliaments will no longer be only to control the European action of  their
governments […] They will intervene in the European decision-making process itself to ensure
that the Union respects the famous principle of  subsidiarity and responds
thereby to the preoccupation expressed at the last referendum: Europe does
too much or does it poorly.86
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He, nevertheless, regretted that the field of  defence, where the Union is
beginning to affirm itself, escaped democratic control of  both national and
European parliamentarians.87 In this respect, Jean-Pierre Jouyet, the Secretary of
State for European Affairs, confirmed that the ‘Europe of  Defence’ is essentially
intergovernmental and as such rests with the Member States, but stressed that it
“will naturally be subject to the control of  national parliaments”.88
Similarly to Haenel, Jean-Pierre Bel, a senator of  the Socialist Party (PS), argued
that for citizens to grasp European integration, Parliament needs to exercise full
control over the principle of  subsidiarity “with respect to the Commission and the
Government”.89 In fact, the direct link between national parliaments and EU
institutions, formally established for the first time in the Lisbon Treaty, is a “notable
progress, which means that the European Union recognises national parliaments
as such, in the same way as the governments of  the Member States”.90 An
observation made by Denis Badré, a senator of  the Mouvement démocrate (MoDem)
and member of  the Union Centriste group, during a discussion on national
parliaments in the Sénat’s European Affairs Committee, elucidated the meaning of
subsidiarity control for the constitutional relations in France: 
As for subsidiarity, we have after all managed to play our role, although it was
not in our political culture to allow a direct dialogue between Parliament and
an institution of  the Union: hitherto everything had to pass through the
Government. This proves that we can unlock our system without undermining
the columns of  the temple.91
This evolution should have immediate positive repercussions at the national
level not least because, as senator Charles Josselin (PS) held, what cumbers the
transposition process is above all Parliament’s exclusion from the process of
preparing EU law.92
In the Assemblée nationale, the Barroso Initiative,93 which enables a political
dialogue between the Commission and national parliaments beyond the narrow
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confines of  subsidiarity, was deemed “not at all comparable” with the early warning
mechanism, chiefly because of  its informal character and lack of  legal effect.94
Nevertheless, the Chairman of  the European Affairs Committee, Pierre Lequiller
MP (UMP), praised the success of  the political dialogue with the Commission,
stating that: “We will exercise this control of  subsidiarity not in a niggling way, but
positively, in order to guarantee that Europe makes a real added value”.95 In a report
on the Lisbon Treaty that he prepared, he underlined that Parliament’s more
resolved ex ante engagement in subsidiarity control would pre-empt Eurosceptics’
contestation of  EU decisions to the extent that these decisions would receive prior
parliamentary validation.96 The Sénat, moreover, urged the political dialogue to
continue to run in parallel with the early warning mechanism.97
2. Good functioning of  the Union 
The Committee of  Laws of  the Assemblée nationale assessed that the contribution
of  national parliaments to the good functioning of  the Union was particularly
underscored in the control of  subsidiarity.98 Yet Jean-Luc Warsmann MP (UMP), the
Chairman of  this Committee and rapporteur for the constitutional amendment that
had been necessary before Parliament could authorise the ratification of  the Lisbon
Treaty, recalled that the French Parliament, just as its counterparts in other Member
States, did not wait for this Treaty provision to establish procedures for the monitoring
of EU decision making, but that they had been developed regardless of  the Lisbon
Treaty.99 The Foreign Affairs Committee of  the Assemblée nationale held that national
parliaments “must contribute, in their own way, to further politicise the institutional
functioning of  the Union”, not merely by participating in conventions aimed at
amending the founding treaties but also in areas where the Union has barely made
any progress, such as fiscal harmonisation, European budget, social Europe, etc.100
Such contribution would consist in providing political clarifications and opening new
horizons of  reform, not least through ad hoc conventions.101
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The Sénat’s European Affairs Committee argued that, while the primary goal
of  the Lisbon Treaty’s provision on national parliamentary contribution to the good
functioning of  the Union is to regroup symbolically the provisions on national
parliaments, it also serves as a recognition of  the collective dimension of  the role
of  national parliaments within the EU, i.e. of  the cooperation between national
parliaments and the European Parliament.102
3. Extension of  codecision 
In the view of  the Foreign Affairs Committee of  the Assemblée nationale, both
the extension of  powers of  the European Parliament and the introduction of  those
of  national parliaments contribute to the reduction of  the democratic deficit.103 A
salient feature of  depillarisation is that it extends the scope of  subsidiarity
jurisdiction of  the Court of  Justice, and, consequently, also of  the national
parliaments’ right of  recourse.104 Pierre Lequiller MP (UMP), the Chairman of  the
European Affairs Committee of  the Assemblée nationale, stressed that “the European
Parliament and national parliaments can, thanks to the Lisbon Treaty, jointly play
an irreplaceable role in laying the democratic foundations of  Europe”.105 In a joint
meeting of  the Assemblée nationale, Sénat and the European Parliament, Hans-Gert
Pöttering, the President of  the European Parliament, assured the gathering that
national parliaments and the European parliament are not competitors, but that
they serve the democracy and unity of  the continent together.106 There is, hence, a
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considerable degree of  agreement that the European and French parliaments fulfill
mutually complementing constitutional functions and that the French Parliament
is, therefore, called upon to intervene not only where the European Parliament lacks
powers of  decision, but also where it possesses them.
Further, Jean-Luc Warsmann MP (UMP) gave an important interpretation of
the meaning of  post-Lisbon relations between France and EU institutions for EU
decision making: 
In revising our Constitution […] we will facilitate decision making in the
European institutions by accepting more widely than in the past the principle
of  qualified majority and the full participation of  the European Parliament in
the decision-making process. […] The legal orders of  the [Member] States and
the European Union improve each other […and] the European legal order,
while remaining distinct from our internal legal order, both enriches and
reinforces it.107
By the same token, Axel Poniatowski MP (UMP), the Chairman of  the Foreign
Affairs Committee of  the Assemblée nationale, held that “the recognition of  the
legislative role of  the European Parliament is a significant progress towards a more
democratic Europe. It is also an essential condition for the development of  EU
politics, which our citizens are calling for”.108 Representing the Nouveau Centre,
Franc�ois Sauvadet MP welcomed the strengthening of  rights of  both the European
Parliament and national parliaments.109 Not all the opposition was as optimistic,
however. For Pierre Moscovici MP (PS), “national parliaments become empty shells,
endowed with a single right, that of  protesting. Meanwhile, the European Parliament
no longer strives to represent ‘the peoples of  the States’ but a perfectly mythical
European people. National parliaments without powers, a European parliament
without a people: the democracy is being murdered”.110 Michel Vaxès MP (PCF)
criticised the negative nature of  parliamentary rights, because they are directed at
curtailing rather than initiating EU action.111 There were dissenting voices in the
governing UMP, too. Jacques Myard MP, for example, asked the Government how
it was possible to transfer dozens of  competences to the Union, therewith taking
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them away from the French Parliament, and in the same time enhance the powers
of  that same Parliament.112 Nonetheless, the Foreign Affairs Committee of  the
Assemblée nationale warned national parliaments against taking refuge in an opposition
role, because the Lisbon Treaty gives national parliamentarians a political role
without putting them in competition with MEPs.113
Finally, the French parliamentary approval of  the Lisbon Treaty is perhaps
encapsulated by the Assemblée nationale’s caveat that: “The quality of  the contribution
of  a Member State to the building of  the policy of  the Union is very significantly
linked to the strength of  its Parliament’s involvement in European affairs”.114
National parliaments are the best intermediaries between the EU and the citizens
and the most disposed forum for the politicisation of  European issues.115
VI Conclusion: learning to play the monist game?
The present survey of  the national parliamentary reception of  the key new
prerogatives introduced by the Lisbon Treaty showcases a latent evolution of  their
role in the intricate processes of  policy and decision making of  the European
Union. A constitutional revolution did not occur. The Government of  the day is
the central target of  political accountability and the pivotal element in the
parliamentary scrutiny puzzle. Yet there is considerable evidence that, in spite of
the variety of  their constitutional bedrocks, parliaments are being gradually drawn
within the Union’s constitutional space.
The British Parliament’s traditional forethoughtfulness translates as prudence
better than as wariness. The usefulness of  the early warning mechanism for the
principle of  subsidiarity, otherwise not winning the hearts of  MPs and peers, was
closely related to the possibility of  acting autonomously from the Government.
While addressing the results of  their European scrutiny to the national government,
both Houses of  Parliament, and the House of  Lords in particular, take due account
of  the actions performed by EU institutions. Influencing the European legislative
process does not reside outside Westminster’s European scrutiny formula. Quite
frequently, information and informal non-binding commitments are secured not
only from the Government but also from EU institutions directly during evidence
sessions, hearings or other means of  correspondence. These findings are indicative
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of  Westminster’s positive attitude towards acting as EU agents, despite the view
generally held by the political parties that the Government is the main addressee of
Parliament’s democratic supervision. Yet certain aspects demonstrate the contrary.
To wit, any parliamentary contribution to the good functioning of  the Union as a
legal obligation was resolutely outlawed and endorsed only as a political obligation.
This means that even though the British Parliament did not oppose such
contribution, it did oppose any possible intrusion by the Union in national
constitutional matters. The rise of  the European Parliament through the extension
of  codecision divided political parties into two camps, with the Labour and Liberal
Democrats welcoming it and the Conservatives and UK Independence Party
rejecting it. There was hence no consensus on the democratic profile of  the
European Parliament. Westminster Parliament was therefore not too enamoured
with the idea of  role-splitting and acting on behalf  of  the EU.
In the French Parliament, the MPs and senators expressed a firm understanding
that the respect for the principle of  subsidiarity is directly linked with the legitimacy
of EU action. This is understandable not least in light of  the negative outcome of
the 2005 referendum on the Constitutional Treaty. Both the Assemblée nationale and the
Sénat are thus fully aware of  the need to immerse themselves more deeply into the
‘mission’ of  democratic legitimisation of  EU activities. The French Parliament
recurrently saw the EU’s call for its contribution to the good functioning of the Union
as necessitating a further bottom-up politicisation of  the EU policy-shaping process,
in which it would play an active role as the institution most well-placed to bridge the
gap between the EU and the citizens. For the majority of  the parliamentarians, the
Lisbon Treaty is indeed the affirmation that their status of  popular representatives is
relevant for a cause that is broader than their own state. Similarly, there was a sizeable
consensus that the extension of  codecision was essential to the Union’s democratic
development. As one parliamentarian argued, it is possible to ‘unlock’ the national
legal and political order without causing the ‘temple’ to founder. In other words,
Parliament can split its roles and be an EU agent too.
On the basis of  the foregoing, we conclude that, with the Lisbon Treaty in
force, the European Union has begun an experimental period of  ground testing,
whereby national parliaments are invited to perform constitutional functions within
a more profoundly interwoven European democratic realm.
The analysis shows that the attitudes of  national parliaments towards the EU
were strongly inspired by the constitutional contexts in which they were established.
The United Kingdom’s dualist approach to international law and its doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty can easily be traced in the approval debates on the Lisbon
Treaty. These two tenets were the main source of  reservation among
parliamentarians towards a more agile participation directly within the EU. In
contrast to this, the French Parliament saw the EU as an opportunity for its own
‘de-rationalisation’ and power expansion. France’s monist approach to international
law catalyses its parliament’s greater openness towards institutional agency in relation
to the Union. This is also the reason why the French Parliament was more prone
to accept EU institutions as partners within a single constitutional compound.
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In summary, we conclude that the EU’s decades-long progress has turned it
into an essentially monist construct in which there are no barriers between the legal
orders of  the EU and the Member States. However, despite this legal borderlessness,
monist and dualist reasonings inspire and underlie the way in which national
parliaments approach EU affairs. The functions inherent to parliaments as
constitutional actors are to a significant extent prefigured by their domestic
constitutional settings, which determine the degree to which they are willing to split
their roles and act as agents of  the European Union. The inclusion of  national
parliaments within the EU umbrella therefore occurs on domestic constitutional
terms. This in turn means that the ideal of  unmarred monism so much coveted by
the EU remains subject to the Member States’ desire to shield their core
constitutional processes and keep them in a form that reflects their legal and political
traditions.
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